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SEIZE THE DAY: RENEWED HOPE FOR THE PERMISSIBILITY 
OF IN REM COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST THE  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AFTER THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S 
SUBSTITUTED OPINION IN $4,480,466.16? 
Evan Gildenblatt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In rem jurisdiction is an enduring legal fiction that continues to divide 
legal scholars and policymakers to this very day. Put simply, in rem 
actions are “against a thing and not a person.”1 The concept of in rem 
jurisdiction supports the power of a court to exercise jurisdiction over and 
pass judgment upon a piece of property itself (rather than an individual), 
because the property may be deemed guilty in the eyes of the law. Rather 
conveniently for courts, in rem jurisdiction can be exercised when the 
owner of a piece of property is unknown to authorities, or when the owner 
is known, but is outside the personal jurisdiction of the court in question.2 
Even in situations in which a property owner is both known to authorities 
and within the personal jurisdiction of the court, the federal government 
has increasingly chosen to initiate in rem civil forfeiture proceedings due 
to the lower burden of proof and reduction in procedural hurdles.3  
Because the property itself is the defendant, court cases are often 
captioned as such in full reporter citations,4 resulting in bizarre names 
such as United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple 
Cider Vinegar;5 United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark 
Fins;6 or United States v. An Article of Hazardous Substance Consisting 
of 50,000 Cardboard Boxes More or Less, Each Containing One Pair of 
Clacker Balls, Labeled in Part: (Box) “* * * Kbonger * * * It’s Fun Test 
Your Skill It Bounces It Flips Count the Hits * * * Specialty Mfg. Co., 
Seattle, Wash. * * *”.7  
To make matters more complicated, the naming conventions of the 
 
 1. In Rem, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). 
 2. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 69 (2015) (“The in rem proceeding affects specific property within 
the jurisdiction of the court and does not adjudicate any personal claim or personal liability, meaning 
personal service is unnecessary for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction in such a proceeding.”). 
 3. See discussion, infra Part II.A. 
 4. For illustrative purposes, in rem cases in this Note will initially be referred to by their complete, 
unabridged captions. Courts and modern scholarly publications typically shorten in rem captions 
whenever possible, and some jurisdictions have done away entirely with using adversarial captions for 
new in rem proceedings.  
 5. 265 U.S. 438 (1924). 
 6. 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 7. 413 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
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United States Supreme Court call for petitioners to be listed first, leaving 
readers with such cases as One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania8 or 
A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. 
Attorney General of Massachusetts,9 in which it may appear on first 
glance that an inanimate object came to life and initiated legal action.10  
In November 2019, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a 
seemingly unremarkable substituted opinion in United States v. 
$4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of America Account Ending in 
2653.11 The court’s holding from its original August 2019 opinion 
remained unchanged; a husband and wife whose property had been seized 
by the federal government were barred under sovereign immunity from 
asserting counterclaims in the civil forfeiture proceedings against their 
property.12 However, the court’s substituted opinion addressed a specific 
question that it had initially declined to consider: whether counterclaims 
against the government are a procedural mechanism available to 
claimants of property that is the defendant in a civil asset forfeiture case.13  
Civil asset forfeiture as a law enforcement practice has been the subject 
of renewed public concern—and indeed, outrage—over the course of the 
last decade.14 The Supreme Court has itself addressed perceived 
governmental abuses of the mechanism, even going so far as to rule that 
punitive or partly-punitive civil forfeiture runs afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.15 The Court, though, has not 
 
 8. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). 
 9. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
 10. Additionally, while federal and state governments alike still frequently utilize in rem 
jurisdiction, a governmental entity need not be part of proceedings. Private parties commonly file in rem 
actions in salvage cases or maritime shipping claims in order to gain title or effectively secure collateral 
for any potential judgment. See, e.g., R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Its 
Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Appurtenances, Cargo, etc., Location Within One (1) Nautical Mile of a Point 
Located at 41 43’32” North Latitude and 49 56’49” West Longitude, Believed to be the RMS Titanic, 435 
F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2006); Steel Coils Inc., v. M/V Lake Marion, Her Engines, Boilers, etc., 331 F.3d 422 
(5th Cir. 2003). 
 11. 942 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter $4,480,466.16], cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 112 (2020). 
 12. United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653, 
936 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 13. $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 659-63. 
 14. See, e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Asset Forfeiture (Home Box Office 
broadcast Oct. 5, 2014); Michael Sallah, et al., Stop and Seize: Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Millions 
of Dollars from Motorists not Charged with Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/; Sarah Stillman, Taken, 
NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken. 
 15. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 
(2019). In Timbs, the Court extended Austin to the states by incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause; 
until that time, it was one of few provisions remaining in the Bill of Rights that had yet to be subject to 
incorporation. The scope of this Note is limited to a specific procedural question in the context of federal 
civil asset forfeiture, but Timbs and the resulting body of literature nevertheless provide considerable 
insight into both the larger public debate and the overall position of civil asset forfeiture in the eyes of the 
2
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specifically addressed the question of whether counterclaims against the 
government are permissible in in rem civil forfeiture actions. In 1991, the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals found such counterclaims to be 
unconditionally barred,16 and the issue has arisen infrequently since then. 
Albeit niche in the larger context of civil forfeiture abuses, the resolution 
of this question could have an outsized influence over federal law 
enforcement practices.  
This Note examines the circuit split created by $4,480,466.16 and 
addresses whether counterclaims against the federal government are 
permissible in in rem civil forfeiture actions. Part II of this Note discusses 
the relevant history of both in rem jurisdiction and civil forfeiture, and 
provides a historical illustration through which civil forfeiture’s 
endurance in the United States can be better understood. Part II also seeks 
to explain the reemergence of civil forfeiture and subsequent efforts to 
restrict its use. Finally, Part II concludes by examining the circuit court 
opinions representing the two major poles in the debate over in rem 
counterclaims. 
Part III of this Note argues that although the First Circuit’s plain 
language interpretation regarding the permissibility of in rem 
counterclaims may be comparatively more intuitive, it remains less 
compelling than the Fifth Circuit’s historical and contextual analysis. 
Additionally, Part III examines whether the nature of modern civil 
forfeiture necessitates an approach that departs from those of both the 
First Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. This Note concludes in Part IV by 
assessing the current legal landscape and reasserting the need for clear, 
workable standards to govern the federal civil forfeiture regime.  
II. BACKGROUND 
In rem jurisdiction came into modern recognizable form under the 
English medieval law of deodand (from the Latin deo dandum: “given to 
god”), but its roots can be traced to legal concepts established by the 
ancient Israelites.17 Prevailing wisdom once held that when an object (or 
domesticated animal) proximately caused the death of a human being, the 
object was guilty of the underlying offense and should be forfeited to the 
Crown so that the departed soul could find peace.18 The doctrine of in rem 
jurisdiction slowly developed under English law to differentiate, albeit 
 
Court. 
 16. See United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($68,000), etc., 927 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1991) 
[hereinafter $68,000]. 
 17. LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 7 (1996). 
 18. Id. at 10–13; ANTHONY GRAY, PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN PERIL: A COMPARATIVE 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 157 (2017). 
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informally, between three general forms of “guilty” property: (1) “things 
guilty,” or those used to violate the law; (2) “things hostile,” or those 
belonging to an enemy; and (3) “things indebted,” or those substituted to 
fulfill the obligation of a debtor.19 And despite the fact that deodands have 
never formally existed within the bounds of American jurisprudence, it is 
also clear that “their underlying principles have endured to the present, 
constituting the foundations of the law of civil forfeiture in the United 
States.”20 
A. Federal Civil Asset Forfeiture 
At its core, modern asset forfeiture is “the taking of property by the 
government without compensation because of the property’s connection 
to criminal activity.”21 While not all in rem actions are civil asset 
forfeiture actions, civil asset forfeiture actions are almost exclusively in 
rem.22 Notably, there exist three general categories of forfeiture under 
federal law: (1) criminal forfeiture; (2) civil forfeiture; and (3) 
administrative forfeiture.23  
Criminal forfeiture accompanies an in personam criminal proceeding 
against a defendant, and the government may only seize the property in 
question if a defendant is convicted of the underlying offense.24 Civil 
forfeiture, on the other hand, is typically undertaken through an in rem 
proceeding against the property itself.25 A civil forfeiture proceeding need 
not accompany any type of criminal action, nor is the government 
required to establish a property owner’s guilt. Rather, “it is enough that 
 
 19. Compare RUFUS WAPLES, A TREATY ON PROCEEDINGS IN REM 2 (1882) with Calero-Toledo 
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–82 (1974) (The United States Supreme Court’s analysis 
organized historical forfeitures into three loosely corresponding categories: (1) deodand; (2) “[f]orfeiture 
. . . at common law from conviction for felonies or treason”; and (3) “statutory forfeitures of offending 
objects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws.”). 
 20. LEVY, supra note 17, at 19. 
 21. United States Department of Justice, Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, Civil 
Asset Forfeiture: Purposes, Protections, and Prosecutors, 67 DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 3, 6 (2019); 
accord DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 1 (2d ed. 2008) (“Asset forfeiture has been described as the divestiture without compensation of 
property used in a manner contrary to the laws of the sovereign.”). 
 22. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 24. But see id. at 21 n.1 (“18 U.S.C. § 545 permits the 
forfeiture of smuggled goods, ‘or the value thereof’ without a criminal conviction. Therefore, the 
forfeiture of the smuggled merchandise would be civil in rem, but an action personally against the party 
to recover the value of the merchandise would be civil in personam.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 23. STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2d ed. 2013). This 
Note’s use of the term “civil forfeiture” encompasses both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. 
 24. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-139, CRIME AND FORFEITURE 5 (2015). 
 25. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 8 (Federal law enforcement agents may take advantage of 
civil forfeiture statutes to “immediately seize and retain possession of the property pending the resolution 
of proceedings,” and are even permitted by some statutes to conduct warrantless seizures “based on 
probable cause.”). 
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the property was involved in a crime to which forfeiture attaches in the 
manner in which statute demands,” and the property owner must then 
rebut a presumption of guilt.26 Of particular significance is the fact that in 
order to succeed, civil forfeiture actions require a lower burden of proof 
than criminal proceedings.27  
Administrative forfeiture is a non-judicial mechanism by which law 
enforcement agencies are granted specific statutory authority to seize 
property during the course of an investigation.28 If no ownership claim is 
filed during a mandated notice period, the agency enters a “declaration of 
forfeiture,” and the matter is effectively concluded.29 Although 
administrative forfeiture is also a civil matter, scholars and practitioners 
often separate it into a distinct category in recognition of its “non-judicial” 
nature and the additional statutory restrictions on its use.30  
Due to the fact that forfeiture laws are far from a monolith, “[t]here is 
neither a common law of forfeiture nor a single provision authorizing 
forfeiture in all cases,” and “[t]he process has almost no rhyme or 
reason.”31 There exist hundreds of federal forfeiture statutes, ranging from 
those that cover violations of the Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982,32 
to those that cover violations of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 
1917.33 Owing to the maritime origins of asset forfeiture, there are of 
course dozens of statutes governing violations at sea, including those 
aimed at “[p]reventing transportation of goods to aid insurrection,”34 or 
 
 26. Id. at 6; accord Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law, 
55 U.S. ATTORNEY’S BULL. 21, 71 (2007) (“[Civil forfeiture] has less stringent standards for obtaining a 
seizure warrant. To obtain a criminal forfeiture-related seizure warrant, a prosecutor must establish 
probable cause to believe that the property to be seized would, in the event of conviction, be subject to 
forfeiture.” In a civil forfeiture proceeding, however, “the government may seize personal property, even 
prior to filing the complaint, through a seizure warrant obtained simply upon showing probable cause to 
believe that the property to be seized is subject to forfeiture.”). 
 27. EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 20. Additionally, the government is permitted to rely on 
hearsay evidence in establishing probably cause. Id.  
 28. CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 11; Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture (last updated Feb. 28, 2020) (“Property that can be 
administratively forfeited is: merchandise the importation of which is prohibited; a conveyance used to 
import, transport, or store a controlled substance; a monetary instrument; or other property [not including 
liquid assets] that does not exceed $500,000 in value.”). 
 29. See DOYLE, supra note 24, at 6 (administrative forfeitures make up a majority of federal civil 
forfeitures and “are, in oversimplified terms, uncontested civil forfeitures”); see also S. Poverty L. Ctr., 
Civil Asset Forfeiture: Unfair, Undemocratic, and Un-American (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.splcenter.org/20171030/civil-asset-forfeiture-unfair-undemocratic-and-un-american (“At 
the federal level, 88% of forfeitures go uncontested.”). 
 30. See CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 9. 
 31. Id. at 4.  
 32. 16 U.S.C. § 773h. 
 33. 50 U.S.C. § 4315(c). 
 34. 50 U.S.C. § 216. 
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providing for “[c]ondemnation of piratical vessels.”35 Former 
Representative Henry Hyde, rarely at a loss for a colorful simile, pilloried 
the broad nature of asset forfeiture by proclaiming that “the hoary 
doctrines of Anglo-American civil asset forfeiture law have been 
resurrected, like some jurisprudential Frankenstein monster, from the 
dark recesses of the past century.”36  
The Asset Forfeiture Program within the Department of Justice 
officially works toward four stated goals, chief among them “[t]o punish 
and deter criminal activity,” and “[t]o recover assets that may be used to 
compensate victims.”37 However, the program’s effectiveness remains 
the subject of considerable disagreement.38 While federal civil asset 
forfeiture has stabilized to some degree over the course of the last five 
years,39 its use in the preceding decades increased by orders of 
magnitude.40 One 2015 analysis found that annual deposits to the 
Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund surged from $93.7 million 
in 1986 to $4.5 billion in 2014—an increase of 4,667 percent.41 Civil asset 
forfeiture by state governments has not escaped scrutiny either. In 2019, 
the Supreme Court incorporated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive 
Fines Clause against the states and found the protection to be 
 
 35. 33 U.S.C. § 384. 
 36. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (1995). Hyde, a highly problematic 
individual for reasons unrelated to the topic of this Note, was a vociferous critic of civil asset forfeiture 
and worked for decades to limit the seizure powers of federal law enforcement agencies. He was a driving 
figure behind the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, which ironically had the long-term effect of 
broadening federal seizure powers. See discussion, infra Part II.D. 
 37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON THE ASSET FORFEITURE 
PROGRAM § 9-118.200 (2019). 
 38. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Study: Civil Asset Forfeiture Doesn’t Discourage Drug Use or Help 
Police Solve Crimes, WASH. POST (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/11/study-civil-asset-forfeiture-doesnt-discourage-
drug-use-or-help-police-solve-crimes/; S. Poverty L. Ctr., supra note 29. 
 39. U.S. DEP;T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT DIV. 20-014, AUDIT OF THE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND 
SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FISCAL YEAR 2019, available at 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/a20014.pdf. 
 40. A 2015 investigation by the Washington Post found that in the previous year, federal law 
enforcement agencies “took more property from American citizens than burglars did.” Christopher 
Ingraham, Law Enforcement Took More Stuff from People than Burglars did Last Year, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/23/cops-took-more-stuff-
from-people-than-burglars-did-last-year/. 
 41. DICK M. CARPENTER II, ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET 
FORFEITURE 5 (2d ed. 2015). The debate has united individuals and causes that can usually be found 
opposite one another in legal battles; see Mary Hudetz, Associated Press, Forfeiture Reform Aligns 
Conservative, Liberal Groups, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-
forfeiture-reform-aligns-conservative-liberal-groups-2015-10; Drug Pol’y All., New Solutions 
Campaign: Civil Asset Forfeiture, https://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-campaign-civil-asset-
forfeiture-reform (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (groups as disparate as the American Civil Liberties Union 
and the Charles Koch Institute have become allies in the push for civil forfeiture reform). 
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“fundamental.”42  
Decades of vigorous debate and continuously escalating stakes beg the 
question, then: if in rem jurisdiction is an antiquated fiction and broad 
civil asset forfeiture is overwhelmingly detested by the general public, 
how did it come to pass that both are still entrenched fixtures of the 
American legal system? 
B. The Liberty and the Influence of British Admiralty Law 
On May 9, 1768, the sloop Liberty—a ship belonging to John Hancock, 
who was at the time one of the wealthiest men in Massachusetts—docked 
in Boston with a shipment of Madeira wine. One month prior, Hancock 
had publicly engaged with British customs officials who boarded another 
of his vessels, the Lydia, when they attempted to operate beyond the 
bounds of their already extensive legal mandate.43 While the Liberty’s 
arrival seemed to go much more smoothly than that of the Lydia, an 
explosive conflict lurked on the horizon. On June 10, a tidewaiter who 
had inspected the Liberty’s cargo upon its initial approach reported that 
the crew had locked him in steerage while they furtively offloaded several 
casks of wine in an attempt to avoid customs duties.44 Customs 
commissioners took swift action to impound the vessel on the same day, 
but were met with a “small riot” in which Bostonians smashed windows, 
lit fires, and “roughed up” several of the British officials.45 Members of 
the mob then proceeded to the wharf where they lifted out of the water a 
“pleasure boat” belonging to customs collector Joseph Harrison, carried 
it to Boston Common, and burned it in public view.46 
 
 42. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019). 
 43. CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 120–
21 (1960). 
 44. O.M. Dickerson, John Hancock: Notorious Smuggler or Near Victim of British Revenue 
Racketeers?, 32 MISS. VALLEY HIST. R. 517, 521–24 (Mar. 1946). The tidewaiter claimed to have come 
forward only because the man who threatened him, Captain John Marshall (not to be confused with the 
future Chief Justice of the United States), had died during the intervening month and he no longer feared 
reprisals. Id.; see also THOMAS HUTCHINSON, HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 188–
90 (John Hutchinson ed., 1828) (to avoid arousing the suspicions of customs collectors, smugglers 
frequently declared and paid duties on token amounts of cargo before spiriting away the rest under cover 
of darkness). 
 45. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 176 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) 
[hereinafter ADAMS LEGAL PAPERS]; accord Letter from the Honorable Commissioners of His Majesty’s 
Customs to Governor Francis Bernard (June 13, 1768) in 4 THE PAPERS OF FRANCIS BERNARD: 
GOVERNOR OF COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–1769, 194 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2015) (in their letter 
to Governor Bernard asking for protection, the customs commissioners noted that the conflagration was 
“[i]ncreasing to such an enormous [p]itch as to give it the [a]ppearance more of an [i]nsurrection than a 
[r]iot”).  
 46. Letter from Governor Francis Bernard to the Earl of Hillsborough, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (June 11, 1768) in 4 THE PAPERS OF FRANCIS BERNARD: GOVERNOR OF COLONIAL 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–1769, 185–86 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2015).  
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Bolstered by reinforcements from the man-of-war HMS Romney in 
Boston Harbor, customs authorities eventually secured the Liberty, but 
not before being forced to flee the city with their families. As tensions 
simmered, Advocate General Jonathan Sewall filed an in rem action 
against the ship and her cargo.47 The trial, however, was not to take place 
in a regular court, and the case would never reach a jury. Rather, it would 
become “one of the strangest trials ever heard in a colonial vice-admiralty 
court.”48 
American colonists had won a major symbolic victory when Parliament 
repealed the Stamp Act49 in 1766, but its immediate replacement—the 
Declaratory Act—was unequivocal in asserting that the Crown possessed 
“full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and 
validity to bind the colonies and people of America . . . in all cases 
whatsoever.” 50 The ensuing series of so-called Townshend Acts levied 
taxes on popular commodities such as paper, glass, and tea,51 and 
imparted upon British customs commissioners the legal authority to 
conduct what were essentially warrantless searches.52 To the ire of 
colonial merchants in particular, British courts of vice-admiralty had also 
been empowered for some time to hear cases of alleged customs 
violations in bench trials conducted by Crown-appointed judges.53 The 
vice-admiralty courts were “objects of intense dislike among the 
colonists,” in no small part because their jurisdiction “was in excess of 
the powers which they possessed in the realm. . . .”54  
 
 47. ADAMS LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 45, at 177. In preparation for another voyage, crew 
members had been loading barrels of oil and tar, all of which were seized. Id. (citing Joseph Harrison Esq. 
v. The Sloop Liberty, 20 Barrels of Tar, 200 Barrels of Oil, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 22 June 1768). 
 48. UBBELOHDE, supra note 43, at 119. Few original records survive from vice-admiralty 
proceedings in the decade leading up to the American Revolution, but letters, notes, and other papers have 
allowed historians to piece together the happenings of the courts remarkably well. 
 49. Duties in American Colonies for Defending, Protecting and Securing the Same Act of 1765 , 5 
Geo. 3, c. 12 (Eng.) 
 50. American Colonies Act of 1766, 6 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Eng.); see Instructions of Boston to its 
Representatives in the General Court (June 17, 1768) in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 216 (Robert J. 
Taylor, ed., 1977) (during a town meeting in Boston to address the seizure of the Liberty, John Adams 
asserted that “the principle on which [the Stamp Act] was founded continues in full force, and a revenue 
is still demanded from America”).  
 51. See, e.g., Indemnity Act of 1767, 7 Geo. 3, c. 56 (Eng.). Colonial assemblies also feared that 
the Townshend Acts would deprive them of “the power of the purse.” JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 255 (1943). 
 52. Townshend Revenue Act of 1766, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.). 
 53. Any remaining notion of impartiality was diminished by the fact that vice-admiralty judges 
were “paid by percentages on the goods they condemned and by fixed fees. . . .” UBBELOHDE, supra note 
43, at 6–7. According to Levy, “[l]ocal American juries would not likely convict a merchant, sea captain, 
or vessel owner for violation of the acts of trade and navigation,” but the British recognized that “[r]esort 
to vice admiralty courts evaded the need for grand jury indictment as well as conviction by a jury.”  LEVY, 
supra note 17, at 42–43. 
 54. HERBERT L. OSGOOD, 1 THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 206 (photo. 
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And so, the Liberty’s fate was sealed in the Court of Vice-Admiralty in 
Boston when Judge Robert Auchmuty, Jr. decreed that the ship be 
forfeited.55 The Liberty was sold at auction in September, where it was 
purchased by none other than Joseph Harrison, the customs commissioner 
whose personal boat had just been torched in the June riot. To add insult 
to Hancock’s injury, Harrison fitted the sloop as a revenue cutter for the 
customs authorities56—a capacity in which it would serve until July 1769, 
when an angry mob in Newport, Rhode Island, seized the vessel and set 
it on fire.57  
C. Codification and Usage Post-1789 
The affair surrounding the Liberty is but one illustration, albeit 
colorful, of general public sentiment toward British admiralty and 
customs laws in the decades immediately preceding the American 
Revolution. In light of the fact that the newly-enfranchised American 
people so despised the statutes and procedures by which the Crown seized 
their property, one might reach the conclusion that the founders of the 
fledgling nation would make a conscious effort to exclude such 
provisions.58 Counterintuitively, however, that is not what happened.59 
During the first session of the First Congress in 1789, representatives 
 
repr. 1958) (1924) (“[The vice-admiralty courts] came generally to be attacked on the ground that their 
existence in the colonies was a violation and deprivation of the right of trial by jury, the ancient guaranty 
of the liberties of Englishmen wherever they lived.”). But see Matthew P. Harrington, Rethinking In Rem: 
The Supreme Court’s New (and Misguided) Approach to Civil Forfeiture, 12 YALE L. & POL. R. 281, 292 
(1994) (Colonial merchants and seamen readily resorted to in rem seizures of vessels when prosecuting 
claims for wages, breach of contract, salvage, or damage to cargo.”). 
 55. Hancock was tried in personam in October 1768 for charges related to illegal offloading of 
Madeira and incitement of a riot, but he prevailed in large part due to the savvy procedural maneuvering 
of his attorney, John Adams. ADAMS LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 45, at 177–79; UBBELOHDE, supra note 
43, at 125–27. 
 56. Revenue cutters are government vessels “employed especially to enforce revenue laws.” See 
Revenue Cutter, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993). Until the re-establishment 
of the U.S. Navy in 1798, the Revenue-Marine, precursor to the modern U.S. Coast Guard, served as the 
only armed federal maritime force. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., RR#517, REVENUE CUTTER 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES, 1790-1915 (2013). 
 57. ADAMS LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 45, at 178–80. In a strange twist, the mob initially 
extinguished the fire after learning that “a considerable [q]uantity of [p]owder was on board,” at which 
point they scuttled the ship and then proceeded to light two additional vessels on fire. BOS. GAZETTE & 
COUNTRY J., July 24, 1769, at 2. 
 58. In the midst of the Liberty affair, John Adams reminded his fellow Bostonians that “it is our 
unalterable resolution, at all times, to assert and vindicate our dear and invaluable rights and liberties, at 
the utmost hazard of our lives and fortunes; and we have a full a rational confidence that no designs formed 
against them will ever prosper.” Instructions of the Town of Boston to their Representatives (June 17, 
1768) in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 502 (Charles 
Francis Adams ed., 1865). 
 59. See LEVY, supra note 17, at 50–51 (“Parliament’s 1696 act of trade and navigation . . . once 
regarded as an instrument of oppression, animated American civil forfeiture law.”).  
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established a detailed customs framework that included in rem civil 
forfeiture.60 One is hard-pressed to believe that a majority of Congress 
had a change of heart or that the passage of forfeiture statutes constituted 
a colossal oversight on the part of everyone involved. Rather, the cash-
strapped young government recognized the need for steady sources of 
revenue and identified in rem forfeiture as one possible solution. In an 
apparent attempt to differentiate the new statutes from the much-reviled 
British admiralty statutes on which they were based, Congress established 
notice requirements and procedures for claimants to dispute a seizure of 
their property.61 While some protections were subsequently diminished 
by statute, the system was nevertheless distinguishable from its British 
progenitor. And as the Court heard civil forfeiture cases, it began to 
establish lasting precedent,62 a not insignificant amount of which still 
stands today. Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted nearly two centuries 
after the first American civil forfeiture measures were codified, “[t]he 
enactment of forfeiture statutes has not abated; contemporary federal and 
state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be 
used in the conduct of a criminal enterprise.”63 
Apart from the Confiscation Act of 1862, allowing the Union to initiate 
“in rem civil proceedings to inflict punishment on rebels who possessed 
property in the North,”64 the government rarely utilized civil forfeiture 
outside of cases at admiralty until the Court expanded its application to 
allow for the seizure of property used in violation of tax laws (particularly 
alcohol tax laws).65 Though somewhat distinct from traditional admiralty 
issues, this expansion can be explained partly by the fact that prior to the 
Sixteenth Amendment, the federal government was dependent on other 
taxes—specifically those on “liquor, customs, and tobacco”—for 
 
 60. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 12, 1 Stat. 29, 39 (establishing forfeiture as a penalty for 
specified customs violations).  
 61. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47. Although seizure itself often serves as de 
facto notice to a property owner, not all property owners are present or aware of the circumstances. Id. 
Thus, the government was required to publish notices widely in the press. Harrington, supra note 54, at 
289. 
 62. See, e.g., United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796) (establishing that 
forfeiture of vessels be tried in admiralty); United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 
(1814) (establishing that the government holds claim to the title of property immediately upon seizure); 
The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289 (1815) (establishing the requirement that the government must 
have actual or constructive possession of property in order to initiate forfeiture proceedings); The Palmyra, 
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (establishing that the government may seize property, regardless of whether 
the owner has been criminally convicted); United States v. The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 
(2 How.) 210 (1844) (establishing liability for innocent owners of ships seized for piratical acts).  
 63. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974). 
 64. LEVY, supra note 17, at 51. 
 65. CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 31–32 (citing Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 
(1878); J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921)). 
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operating revenue.66 A piecemeal expansion continued through the early 
and mid-twentieth century until Congress implemented a wholesale 
overhaul by permitting law enforcement agencies to seize not only the 
instrumentalities of a crime, but “the proceeds of the offense,” and 
“property used to facilitate it.”67 
D. The Re-Emergence of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Subsequent Reform 
Efforts 
As the crime rate rose and drug trafficking reached record highs in the 
United States throughout the 1970s and 1980s,68 Congress sought to take 
advantage of civil forfeiture in a way that it had never done before. In a 
1981 report to then-Senator Joseph R. Biden, the Comptroller General of 
the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) claimed that despite passage of 
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (“OCCA,” also known as the 
“Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,” or “RICO”), 
“[t]he Government has simply not exercised the kind of leadership and 
management necessary to make asset forfeiture a widely used law 
enforcement technique.”69 Congress followed some of the GAO report’s 
recommendations by passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984 (“CCCA”) and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994 (“VCCLEA”), expanding civil forfeiture into a blunt law 
enforcement tool capable of being wielded in a sweeping manner.70  
With this vast expansion, however, came concern from across the 
political spectrum that civil forfeiture was enabling law enforcement 
agencies to violate fundamental rights with near-impunity. As the Court 
sanctioned the expansion in large part and established that claimants were 
no longer entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to receive pre-seizure notice in civil forfeiture cases,71 successive 
Congresses debated how to reestablish safeguards akin to those passed by 
the First Congress.  
These efforts culminated in the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 
 
 66. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 60 (1993) (“In 1902, for example, 
nearly 75 percent of total federal revenues . . . was raised from taxes on liquor, customs, and tobacco.”). 
 67. CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 33. 
 68. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, 
https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm. 
 69. U.S. GAO COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GGD-81-51, ASSET FORFEITURE—A SELDOM USED 
TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING ii (1981) (referencing both criminal and civil forfeiture). 
 70. Shawn Kantor, Carl Kitchens, & Steven Pawlowski, Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police 
Incentives: Evidence from the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 23873, 2017), available at http://www/nber.org/papers/w23873; 
EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 24. 
 71. EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 55. 
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2000 (“CAFRA”)—a bipartisan undertaking that created a clear 
“innocent owner” defense, allowed successful claimants to recover 
interest and attorney fees, and established a four-part test which, when 
satisfied, waives the federal government’s protections under sovereign 
immunity.72 However, contrary to its drafters’ recognition that civil 
forfeiture “is a useful law enforcement tool, but one that needs to be 
carefully monitored,”73 CAFRA, in its attempt to hold the government 
accountable, actually further expanded the federal government’s seizure 
powers in some areas.74 Subsequent reform efforts, despite gaining 
across-the-board support,75 have fallen flat and largely failed to curtail 
what has become an increasingly significant enforcement tool. 
E. The Circuit Split Over In Rem Counterclaims 
1. United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($68,000), etc. 
On November 23, 1988, Giovanni Castiello drove his Lincoln Town 
Car to Boston’s Logan Airport for a meeting with his new cocaine 
supplier, “Joe.”76 One week prior, Castiello had driven with Joe to a 
restaurant and agreed to purchase four kilograms of cocaine in exchange 
for $68,000 in cash. However, when the two met to complete their 
transaction and Castiello presented a shoe box of $68,000 in mixed bills, 
he subsequently learned that Joe was in fact Agent Joseph W. Desmond 
of the Drug Enforcement Agency.77 Castiello was indicted, tried, and 
convicted of attempting to possess, with intent to distribute, a Schedule II 
controlled substance, for which the district court sentenced him to ninety-
seven months in prison.78  
After exhausting his criminal appeals, Castiello then focused his 
attention on appealing the civil forfeiture of his cash and car, in addition 
 
 72. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 983. 
 73. Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses and Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) 
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 74. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 27; see also Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses and Reforms: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations) (“It 
was a noble effort, but it plainly fell short. . . . Forfeiture’s only defenders seem to be its beneficiaries, the 
law enforcement agencies entitled to keep the proceeds of their seizures.”). By leaving the equitable 
sharing framework effectively untouched, CAFRA also did little to disincentivize forfeiture as a source 
of revenue for the government. 
 75. See Drug Pol’y All., supra note 41. 
 76. $68,000, 927 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 77. Id. at 31–32. 
 78. Castiello v. United States, 915 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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to the “portable telephone” and “various other items of personal property” 
that had been inside the Town Car on the day of his arrest.79 And while 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in March 1991 focused largely upon 
whether Castiello’s counsel was afforded ample time to prepare for the 
case and whether Castiello had even met his burden of proof “that the 
property was not used in violation of the statute,”80 the court also rebuffed 
Castiello’s “self-styled counterclaim” against the government for 
possession of the property that had been inside of his car.81 
The court first directed its attention to the plain meaning of 
“counterclaim,” and noted that “[b]y definition, a counterclaim is a turn-
the-tables response directed by one party (‘A’) at another party (‘B’) in 
circumstances where ‘B’ has earlier lodged a claim in the same 
proceeding against ‘A.’”82 Thus, because civil forfeiture actions are in 
rem and the government did not file an accompanying in personam civil 
action against Castiello, “there was no ‘claim’ to ‘counter,’” and 
“Castiello’s self-styled counterclaim was a nullity.”83 
Next, the court pointed out that the warrant and subsequent order of 
forfeiture against the Town Car “did not expressly extend to personal 
property within the vehicle,” and was therefore not even at issue (despite 
the fact that the car remained in government custody).84 As a result, the 
court felt that Castiello ought to have sought the return of his property by 
administrative means, by bringing a motion in his underlying criminal 
 
 79. See $68,000, 927 F.2d at 31 (the district court granted the government’s motion for summary 
judgment) (21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) empowers the government to seize “[a]ll conveyances . . . which are 
used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, 
possession, or concealment of [controlled substances],” while 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6) calls for the forfeiture 
of “[a]ll moneys . . . furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled 
substance . . . .”). 
 80. Id.at 32 (quoting United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery St., Merrimac, 
Mass., 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 81. Id. at 34–35. 
 82. Id. at 34. 
 83. Id. To reiterate its point, the court noted that “instead of being dragooned into the case as a 
defendant, [Castiello] intervened as a claimant,” and was therefore not entitled to file a counterclaim. Id. 
 84. Id. at 34–35 (citing United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door Sedan, VIN: 116–
036–12–004084, 711 F.2d 1297, 1304–05 (5th Cir. 1983)). Similar to $68,000, the car at issue in 1978 
Mercedes Benz was seized under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) after its owners were suspected of transporting 
cocaine. The district court found that while the government possessed probable cause to seize the car 
itself, it did not hold title over the property inside. The Fifth Circuit agreed and held that although the car 
phone was bolted down and attached to the vehicle’s main electrical system, the statute did not permit for 
the forfeiture of a vehicle’s “tools and appurtenances,” and there existed no legislative record from the 
passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 to indicate that Congress 
intended appurtenances to be included in the forfeiture of a vehicle by default. For the uninitiated, car 
phones were the only commercially-available mobile telephones in the United States until Motorola 
introduced the DynaTAC to consumer markets in 1983. Because analog cellular service was not offered 
to consumers until 1984, earlier car phones operated on a VHF system and required both a power source 
and fairly unwieldy radio antenna. 
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case, or by filing a separate civil action.85 While it was far from critical to 
the larger holding, the court’s decision to discuss and subsequently reject 
the availability of counterclaims as a remedy in in rem actions left an 
impression, as it came to be relied upon by district courts in the Second, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.86 
After the First Circuit’s decision in $68,000, no sister circuit explicitly 
embraced or rejected its anti-counterclaim position until the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals heard the case of the Zappone family.87 On November 
8, 2012, agents of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) executed a search 
warrant against the Ohio Scrap Corporation in Delta, Ohio.88 The raid was 
the result of an IRS investigation into the business and its owners—Carrie 
and Todd Zappone—for illegal structuring under 31 U.S.C. §  
5324(a)(3).89 During the course of the search, federal agents seized a large 
amount of currency from a safe, and the IRS initiated a forfeiture action 
in April 2013 against $1,264,000.00 in cash.90 The Zappones filed an 
administrative claim for the cash, and then followed up with an amended 
claim asserting that the IRS had, in actuality, seized “at least” 
$3,150,000.00.91 In February 2015, the IRS denied the Zappones’ 
administrative claims from the previous year, and the Zappones 
responded by bringing a new action against the government under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)92 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
 
 85. Id.at 35; see also United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[I]t is 
fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice process that property involved in the proceeding, 
against which no Government claim lies, be returned promptly to its rightful owner,” thus a claimant is 
entitled to bring civil action for return of such property.). 
 86. See United States v. Assorted Computer Equip., No. 03-2356V, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6334 
(W.D. Tenn. Jan, 9, 2004); United States v. All Funds Located in Banca Popolare Friuladria Account 
Number 70451 in the Name of Senol Taskin, No. 5:13-cv-1090 (GLS/TWD), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26572 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014); United States v. 8 Luxury Vehicles, 88 F. Supp 3d 1332 (M.D. Fla 2015); 
United States v. Various Rest. Furniture & Goods of Iranian Origin, No. CV 15-259-GW(MRWx), 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186604 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016); United States v. Certain Real Prop. Commonly Known 
as 4512 South Drexel Blvd. Chicago, Illinois, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (E.D. Wis. 2018); United States v. 
$4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of America Account Ending in 2653, No. 3:17-CV-2989-D, 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70180 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2018); United States v. Approximately $10,128,847.42 
Seized from US Bank Account No. -5234, No. 1:18-CV-0279-SWS-MLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207350 
(D.N.M. Dec. 3, 2018). 
 87. Zappone v. United States, 870 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Zappone]. 
 88. Elizabeth Reed, IRS Agents Raid Delta Scrap Yard, NBC 24 NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012), 
https://nbc24.com/news/local/irs-agents-raid-delta-scrap-yard?id=823015. 
 89. Illegal structuring is the act of conducting banking transactions in such a way as to “avoid the 
creation of certain records and reports required by the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and/or IRC 6050I.” I.R.M. 
§ 4.26.13.1(1) (2020).  
 90. Ohio Scrap Corp. v. United States (Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS), No. 3:14 CV 535, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 142156, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2014); United States v. $1,264,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 
No. 3:13-cv-905, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49566 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2018). 
 91. See Ohio Scrap Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142156, at *2. 
 92. 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. 
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Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.93 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
government and named federal employees,94 and the Zappones filed an 
appeal with the Sixth Circuit asserting, in part, that the district court erred 
by choosing not to equitably toll their otherwise time-barred FTCA 
claim.95 In affirming the district court’s holding, the Sixth Circuit noted 
that a civil forfeiture action “is a suit in rem against the res,” and is 
therefore “brought against property, not people.”96 Then, by way of 
affirming the district court’s ruling that the Zappones could not have 
pursued a Bivens claim in a civil forfeiture proceeding to begin with, the 
court cited $68,000 to reiterate that “while the purported owner of the 
property may intervene in the action, he may not assert counterclaims 
against the United States.”97  
Although the issue of in rem counterclaims was nearly infinitesimal in 
the scheme of the Zappone cases, district courts in the Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits nevertheless relied upon the Sixth Circuit’s dicta to bar such 
claims in accordance with the First Circuit’s original interpretation.98 The 
First Circuit, meanwhile, has continued to utilize variants of the $68,000 
standard in such high profile cases as United States v. One-Sixth Share of 
James J. Bulger in All Present & Future Proceeds of Mass Millions 
Lottery Ticket No. M246233, Registered in the Name of Michael Linskey, 
a dispute over lottery winnings initially forfeited by notorious mob boss 
Whitey Bulger.99 
 
 93. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court in Bivens held that individuals whose constitutional rights are 
violated by federal agents have an implied right of action against said agents. However, the doctrine has 
been significantly restricted and sparingly applied in the years since. 
 94. Zappone v. United States, No. 3:15 CV 2135, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113083, at *12–*13 
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2016). 
 95. Zappone, 870 F.3d 551, 561 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 96. Id. (quoting United States v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, & 
747.714/278 Banco Espanol de Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
 97. Id. (citing $68,000, 927 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1991)).  
 98. See United States v. Certain Real Prop. Commonly Known as 4512 South Drexel Blvd. Chi., 
Ill., 381 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (E.D. Wis. 2018); United States v. Approximately $10,128,847.42 Seized from 
US Bank Account No. -5234, No. 1:18-CV-0279-SWS-MLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207350 (D.N.M. 
Dec. 3, 2018). 
 99. 326 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Because civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, the property 
subject to forfeiture is the defendant. Thus, defenses against the forfeiture can be brought only by third 
parties, who must intervene.”). Bulger was a long-time Boston mob boss and criminal informant who 
disappeared in 1994, shortly before federal agents planned to unseal an indictment against him for 
racketeering. Upon his capture in 2011, Bulger was tried and convicted of numerous crimes, including 
eleven murders, and sentenced to two life terms. In 2018, he was murdered in prison. See Robert D. 
McFadden, Whitey Bulger is Dead in Prison at 89; Long-Hunted Boston Mob Boss, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/obituaries/whitey-bulger-dead.html. 
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2. United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of 
America Account Ending in 2653 
Throughout September and October 2017, law enforcement officials 
from United States Department of Veterans Affairs—as part of an 
ongoing effort in the decades-long fight against benefits fraud100—
obtained multiple seizure warrants for property and bank accounts 
belonging to Jon and Tess Davis, the owners of Retail Ready Career 
Center (“RRCC”) in Garland, Texas.101 RRCC was a for-profit vocational 
training center that hosted six-week HVAC certification programs, and 
the VA Inspector General had suspected for months that the company was 
in violation of the so-called “85-15 Rule.”102 As a result of an “aggressive 
sales pitch,” ninety percent of RRCC students were veterans, and in 2016 
alone the company received $28,858,494 in VA education benefits.103 
After federal agents executed the first seizure warrants against RRCC on 
September 20, the Texas Veterans Commission—the state agency 
responsible for accrediting educational and vocational programs that 
receive VA education benefits—revoked RRCC’s approval.104 Shortly 
thereafter, RRCC closed its doors.105  
The seizures from RRCC included the contents of a Bank of America 
account containing $4,480,466.16 (the named defendant); hundreds-of-
thousands of dollars more spread across six accounts at Bank of America, 
Capital One, Charles Schwab, Wells Fargo, and the Bank of Utah; a 2014 
Lamborghini Aventador; a 2016 Ferrari 488; a 2017 Bentley Continental 
GT V8; a 2017 Mercedes-Benz AMG S63; a 2016 Mercedes-Benz G63; 
a 2016 Dodge Ram 2500; a 2016 BMW Alpina; real property at 14888 
 
 100. See, e.g., David Whitman, Report—The Cycle of Scandal at For-Profit Colleges, Truman, 
Eisenhower, and the First GI Bill Scandal, THE CENTURY FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/truman-eisenhower-first-gi-bill-scandal/. 
 101. See Government’s Response to Motion for Immediate Release of Seized Property at PageID 
417-20, United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized From Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653, No. 
3:17-CV-2989-D, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70180 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2017). 
 102. 38 C.F.R. § 21.4201(a). Initially codified in 1952, the 85-15 Rule holds that the VA may not 
disburse additional educational benefits to students in an approved program if more than eighty-five 
percent of the students already in the program are veterans receiving federal student aid.  
 103. Eva-Marie Ayala, Hundreds of Veterans Scramble After Garland For-Profit College Closes, 
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2017/09/28/hundreds-of-veterans-scramble-after-garland-
for-profit-college-closes/. 
 104. Statement on Retail Ready Career Center Closure, TEX. VETERANS COMM’N (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.tvc.texas.gov/statement-on-retail-ready-career-center-closure/. 
 105. Noelle Walker, Garland Vocational School Abruptly Closes Leaving Students and Staff 
Wondering Why, NBC 5 DFW (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/garland-vocational-
school-abruptly-closes-leaving-students-and-staff-wondering-why/40653/; Kevin Cokely, Investigators 
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Lake Forest Drive in Dallas, Texas; and real property at 195 North 200 
West and 1408 West 2125 South in Logan, Utah—all belonging to Jon 
and Tess Davis personally or through incorporated entities.106 Prosecutors 
alleged that in total, Jon and Tess Davis, through RRCC, received “more 
than $67 million from the VA,” to which they were not entitled.107 
Citing an ongoing criminal investigation, the government asked the 
district court to stay the forfeiture proceedings108 and also requested that 
the court dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims.109 The district court denied the 
government’s motion to stay the proceedings but granted it leave to file a 
second amended complaint, setting in motion a timeline of separate legal 
proceedings that have yet to be concluded at the time of publication for 
this Note.110  
RRCC’s two constitutional counterclaims alleged an unreasonable 
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and a violation of Fifth 
Amendment due process rights. Its argument centered largely around the 
ideas that “as a matter of historical practice, an owner of arrested property 
can bring suit against the government in actions in rem,” and that 
counterclaims are permissible under the Supplemental Rules for 
Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions.111  Further, 
RRCC asserted that because the Fifth Circuit had never explicitly held in 
rem counterclaims to be impermissible and the First Circuit did not cite 
authority for its position on counterclaims in $68,000, the government 
could point to no solid basis for its motion. Unpersuaded, the district court 
held that “absent binding Fifth Circuit authority to the contrary . . . as a 
claimant in an in rem civil forfeiture action, RRCC cannot bring a 
counterclaim.”112 
After the district court entered a final judgment to dismiss RRCC’s 
counterclaims, RRCC appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Without addressing 
the categorical bar on in rem counterclaims, however, the court promptly 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims due to “a more 
fundamental reason”: the government had not waived sovereign 
 
 106. United States’ Third Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at PageID 1299-1303, United 
States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized From Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653, No. 3:17-CV-2989-
D, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70180 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2018); the basis for forfeiture included wire fraud, 
mail fraud, theft of government funds, and conspiracy to commit any specified unlawful activity. 
 107. Id. at PageID 1304. 
 108. A court may stay forfeiture proceedings if it “determines that civil discovery will adversely 
affect the ability of the Government to conduct a related criminal investigation or the prosecution of a 
related criminal case.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1). 
 109. United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653, 
No. 3:17-CV-2989-D, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70180, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2018). 
 110. Id. at *22. 
 111. Id. at *19. 
 112. Id. at *21–22 (the court took advantage of the opportunity to point out that RRCC also did not 
cite binding authority for its counterclaim argument). 
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immunity, and the district court, therefore, lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction from the beginning.113 Although RRCC contended that the 
government’s sovereign immunity had been waived under CAFRA’s 
2000 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)–(4), the court held that such 
a waiver does not extend to constitutional torts.114 RRCC also attempted 
to argue that “simply by ‘initiat[ing] an in rem proceeding,’” the 
government waived sovereign immunity.115 The court labeled RRCC’s 
argument “grandiose” and noted that such a precedent was only 
applicable “to admiralty cases allowing a limited cross-libel against the 
United States when the United States sues another vessel for collision 
damages.”116 
In response to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, RRCC filed a petition for a 
panel rehearing which the court denied in November 2019. The opinion 
denying RRCC’s request, however, contained something far less common 
than the cursory denial of a petition for panel rehearing: the court 
withdrew the opinion it had published only three months prior and 
substituted it with an opinion addressing in rem counterclaims—the very 
issue it had initially declined to review.117 For reasons that remain unclear, 
the same Fifth Circuit panel maintained its original position that RRCC’s 
counterclaims were barred by sovereign immunity, but “declin[ed] to 
endorse” the position that in rem counterclaims against the government 
are categorically impermissible, thereby creating a circuit split: 
[T]he fact that a forfeiture proceeding is “in rem, not in personam” does 
not determine a claimant's rights in the proceeding. The forfeiture rules 
allow a claimant to take numerous actions respecting the seized property, 
even though the proceeding is “in rem.” To begin with, a claimant may 
“file a claim” to protect his interests in the property. He may also file: (1) 
an answer to the government's complaint, Supp. Rule G(5)(b); (2) a Rule 
12 motion, id.; (3) objections to government interrogatories, Supp. 
Rule G(6)(b); (4) a motion to suppress use of the seized property as 
evidence, Supp. Rule G(8)(a); and (5) a motion raising a defense under 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, Supp. Rule G(8)(e). 
. . . And the civil forfeiture statute lets claimants do other things, such as: 
(1) raise and prove an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. § 983(d); (2) 
move to set aside the forfeiture for lack of notice, id. § 983(e); and (3) seek 
immediate release of seized property, id. § 983(f). The point being: If a 
claimant can do all this in in rem forfeiture proceedings, it cannot be that 
he is barred from filing counterclaims simply because forfeitures are “in 
 
 113. United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653, 
936 F.3d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 114. Id. at 237–38 (citing Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 565 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010)). 
 115. Id. at 238. 
 116. Id. at 238–39. 
 117. $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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rem and not in personam.”118 
While the court did make note of the practically identical nature of Rule 
13 intervenors to claimants in a civil forfeiture proceeding (“[i]n $68,000 
itself, the First Circuit said Castiello ‘intervened as a claimant”), it staked 
its argument primarily on the panoply of rights available to claimants, as 
well as longstanding practice in admiralty cases to allow cross-libels. 119 
The latter seemed especially persuasive to the court, because civil asset 
forfeiture is largely rooted in Anglo-American admiralty law and 
procedure in such cases is governed to this day by the same set of 
supplemental rules to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.120 Ultimately, 
the court held that claimants should not be universally barred from filing 
counterclaims against the government in a forfeiture proceeding simply 
because the property, and not the claimant, is the defendant.121 
III. DISCUSSION 
When the Fifth Circuit “respectfully reject[ed] the First Circuit’s broad 
rationale for barring counterclaims in in rem civil forfeiture proceedings,” 
it cast doubt over a precedent that had been relied upon by federal courts 
across the nation for nearly three decades.122 The fact that a vast majority 
of civil forfeitures are uncontested,123 coupled with the availability of 
additional remedies,124 means that the question of in rem counterclaims 
rarely arises. However, the circuit split created by $4,480,466.16 has both 
procedural and substantive implications, and federal courts are now left 
to resolve irreconcilable holdings with little to no input from the Supreme 
Court or other circuits. 
Part A of this Section explores the theory on which the First Circuit 
rested its unconditional bar on in rem counterclaims against the 
government, and illustrates why that theory is insufficient to address the 
matter at hand. Part B surveys the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and concludes 
that the court employed a more comprehensive and effective means of 
analysis than the First Circuit. Finally, Part C argues that the modern 
application of in rem civil forfeiture has proliferated far beyond its 
intended uses, and thus, no longer serves the interests of justice. 
 
 118. Id. at 659–60. 
 119. Id. at 661. A cross-libel in admiralty is the functional equivalent of a counterclaim. See Cross 
Libel, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). 
 120. $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 661–63 (considering contextual clues in the Supplemental Rules 
for Admiralty or Maritime and Asset Forfeiture Actions, “it would seem anomalous to say that 
counterclaims are always out-of-bounds in in rem proceedings”). 
 121. Id. at 663. 
 122. Id. at 660. 
 123. See S. Poverty L. Ctr., supra note 29. 
 124. See generally $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 659–60. 
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A. The First Circuit’s reliance solely on plain meaning interpretation 
failed to account for significant historical factors, thereby diminishing 
the reliability of its opinion. 
The First Circuit in $68,000 deemed Castiello’s attempted 
counterclaim “a nullity,” and relied solely on a plain meaning 
interpretation to find an unconditional bar on in rem counterclaims against 
the government.125 Likewise, $68,000’s progeny have also failed to 
unearth binding precedent or provide substantial additional support for a 
blanket prohibition on counterclaims.126 While a strict plain meaning 
interpretation may seem the most intuitive—after all, an inanimate object 
clearly lacks the agency necessary to initiate a counterclaim—it critically 
fails to take into account how the doctrine in question was shaped. 
In the context of modern in rem civil forfeiture, it is insufficient to 
frame a counterclaim merely as “a turn-the-tables response directed by 
one party (‘A’) at another party (‘B’) in circumstances where ‘B’ has 
earlier lodged a claim in the same proceeding against ‘A.’”127 Apart from 
customs and tax violations, in rem forfeiture was useful in the early days 
of the Republic for seizing property when an owner was unknown or 
outside the reach of the court. Now, however, the government rarely finds 
occasion to seize active pirate ships and is more than capable of 
ascertaining the identity and whereabouts of a given property owner. 
Moreover, the First Circuit’s remarks in $68,000 on in rem counterclaims 
took up just two paragraphs and could easily be construed as dicta.128 
Despite its shortcomings, however, the $68,000 rule was widely applied 
by courts across the country when addressing this issue.  
An in rem claimant likely holds title to the property in question; to 
impose an unconditional bar on in rem counterclaims against the 
government risks elevating form over substance, and tramples on the 
rights of owners and claimants in the process. There is some scholarly 
support for the argument that by bringing an in rem civil forfeiture action, 
the government consents to potential counterclaims from owners because 
jurisdiction for the counterclaim itself is not in rem.129 But even without 
 
 125. See $68,000, 927 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1991). Notably, the court also did not cite any judicial 
authorities to support its position. 
 126. See discussion, supra Part II.E.1. 
 127. $68,000, 927 F.2d at 34. 
 128. See $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 660; $68,000, 927 F.2d at 34. 
 129. See, e.g., Paul S. Grossman, Appellate Jurisdiction for Civil Forfeiture: The Case for the 
Continuation of Jurisdiction Beyond the Release of the Res, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 695 (1991) 
(“Jurisdiction for the counterclaim is not in rem because in rem jurisdiction is asserted against property, 
not an individual. Therefore, the inference must be that when a plaintiff brings an in rem action, the 
plaintiff consents to in personam jurisdiction for counterclaims.”). As was the case in $4,480,466.16, the 
government may still be able to validly invoke sovereign immunity, but the waivable nature of sovereign 
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a general rule of consent, a pure plain meaning interpretation with no 
precedential support is unable to stand on its own. 
B. The Fifth Circuit’s normative interpretation is a more accurate 
reflection of both historical precedent and the current legal realities. 
In addressing the question of whether counterclaims against the 
government are permissible in in rem civil forfeiture cases, the Fifth 
Circuit took a more comprehensive approach that considered existing 
legal precedent and historical context, in addition to plain meaning. While 
the First Circuit’s interpretation was certainly neither unreasonable nor 
illogical, the Fifth Circuit took exception to it on three main grounds: (1) 
the procedural rules governing forfeiture actions provide a claimant with 
a plethora of options, and this fact “sits uneasily with the notion that a 
claimant can never bring counterclaims in those proceedings”; (2) the 
strong similarities between intervenors and claimants would seem to 
contravene “a blanket rule barring claimants’ counterclaims in forfeiture 
proceedings”; and (3) admiralty law has “long entertained counterclaims 
(or their equivalents) in in rem proceedings.”130  
The first prong of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis rested on the notion that 
“the answer to this puzzle does not lie in the brute fact that, in a forfeiture 
proceeding, ‘[t]he property is the defendant.’”131 Rather, the court 
outlined five uncontested mechanisms by which claimants can assert their 
interests in a civil forfeiture proceeding, and alluded to the possibility that 
a claimant’s best option to preserve a property interest may well lie in a 
counterclaim.132 Perhaps more substantively, the court identified striking 
similarities between a claimant who intervenes and one who attempts to 
file a counterclaim. Examining the fact that “[u]nder federal law, an 
intervenor of right is treated as he were an original party and has equal 
standing with the original parties,” 133 the court found nothing in “the 
kinship between ‘claimants’ and ‘intervenors’” to support an 
unconditional bar on counterclaims.134 
Most compelling from a procedural perspective, however, is the final 
prong of the court’s analysis: “adopting the First Circuit's reasoning 
in $68,000 would conflict with practice in admiralty cases,” to which civil 
 
immunity also means that it alone cannot be seen to impose a uniform bar on counterclaims against the 
government. 
 130. $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 660–61. 
 131. Id. at 660 (quoting $68,000, 927 F.2d at 34). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (quoting Brown v. Demco, 792 F.2d 478, 480–81 (5th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 134. Id. at 660–61. 
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asset forfeiture is still strongly linked.135 Although the court looked only 
to in rem actions filed by private parties against the property of other 
private parties (providing a differentiating factor to actions that the 
government has initiated), it nevertheless clearly rebutted the First 
Circuit’s blanket prohibition. The Fifth Circuit also cited a case in which 
the government itself “intervened in [a] plaintiffs’ in rem action as a party 
defendant and filed a counterclaim asserting a property right [to a disputed 
seventeenth-century shipwreck off the Florida coast].”136  
The 2000 Advisory Committee Note for the Supplemental Rules for 
Admiralty or Maritime and Asset Forfeiture Action, while not explicitly 
addressing the permissibility of in rem counterclaims, also clarifies that 
plaintiffs are required to put up security against any counterclaim in an in 
rem action “when the counterclaim is asserted by a person who has given 
security to respond in damages in the original action.”137 If in rem 
counterclaims were not permissible, one would be hard-pressed to find a 
reason for the Advisory Committee’s clarification, or indeed, the very 
presence of a requirement to put up security against a counterclaim in the 
first place.138 
Until now, courts have accepted the government’s formalistic analysis 
that claimants are not only not defendants, but also not full parties to in 
rem civil forfeiture actions. Putting aside for a moment that such an 
analysis does not comport with the history discussed above, it potentially 
leaves owners and claimants without a course of action that suitably 
guarantees their rights.139 Therefore, it seems clear that the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning in $4,480,466.16 was correct and should be adopted by lower 
courts and sister circuits, unless or until the Supreme Court takes up the 
matter or Congress significantly amends the relevant statutes. 
C. Modern legal realities necessitate a renewed examination of the 
procedure governing in rem claims. 
Three interconnected explanations illustrate why in rem counterclaims 
 
 135. Id. at 661; accord supra note 122. 
 136. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, Her Tackle, 
Armament, Apparel and Cargo Located Within 2500 Yards of a Point at Coordinates 24.31.5’ North 
Latitude and 82.50 West Longitude, 569 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 137. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. E(7)(a) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
 138. To be clear, counterclaims may still be barred for other reasons.  
 139. See, e.g., Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 5 (1999) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) (“We put the onus on the citizen to perfectly navigate the bureaucratic 
labyrinth in order to liberate what is presumptively his or hers in the first place. And if the citizen proves 
inept in proving his innocence, in effect, the government may keep the property without ever having to 
justify or explain its actions.”). 
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against the government continue to command so little attention: (1) until 
the latter part of the twentieth century, in rem civil forfeiture remained a 
mechanism that was fairly limited in scope and application;140 (2) since 
in rem civil forfeitures are overwhelmingly uncontested,141  there is little 
opportunity for disputes to rise through the court system; and (3) because 
the First Circuit’s $68,000 precedent stood alone for decades and in rem 
civil forfeiture procedures allow a claimant to take any number of actions 
aside from a counterclaim (as the Fifth Circuit explained in 
$4,480,466.16), claimants may have consistently deemed it more prudent 
to undertake an alternative legal strategy. 
If, however, “proceedings in rem are simply structures that allow the 
Government to quiet title to criminally-tainted property in a single 
proceeding,”142 it then seems reasonable to assume that in rem civil 
forfeiture cannot stand as it currently is while also respecting procedural 
rights. The government possesses a great deal of power when it initiates 
in rem civil forfeiture actions, and the $68,000 rule does not provide 
suitable remedies for owners or claimants.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although an admittedly miniscule component of the larger public 
debate over asset forfeiture, the question of whether counterclaims against 
the government are permissible in federal in rem civil forfeiture actions 
is more than an exercise in semantics. The lines between in rem and in 
personam jurisdiction have been sufficiently blurred to the point that 
Congress must seriously consider a comprehensive restructuring of civil 
forfeiture law that establishes clear safeguards based on modern realities. 
The present circuit split is but one result of a failed system that has 
proliferated far beyond its mandate and no longer adequately serves the 




 140. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.C. 
 141. See supra note 29; see also Michael van den Berg, Proposing a Transactional Approach to 
Civil Asset Forfeiture, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 893 (2015) (“[M]ost [mid- to low-value chattel] are not 
economically valuable enough to merit a defense, absent a blanket right to counsel.”). 
 142. CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 34. 
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